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We analyzed crop production, physical inputs, and land use at the
country level to assess technological changes behind the threefold
increase in global crop production from 1961 to 2014. We translated
machinery, fuel, and fertilizer to embedded energy units that, when
summed up, provided a measure of agricultural intensification
(human subsidy per hectare) for crops in the 58 countries responsible
for 95% of global production. Worldwide, there was a 137% increase
in input use per hectare, reaching 13 EJ, or 2.6% of the world’s
primary energy supply, versus only a 10% increase in land use. In-
tensification was marked in Asia and Latin America, where input-use
levels reached those that North America and Europe had in the ear-
lier years of the period; the increase was more accentuated, irre-
spective of continent, for the 12 countries with mostly irrigated
production. Half of the countries (28/58), mainly developed ones,
had an average subsidy >5 GJ/ha/y (with fertilizers accounting
for 27% in 1961 and 45% in 2014), with most of them (23/28)
using about the same area or less than in 1961 (net land sparing
of 31 Mha). Most of the remaining countries (24/30 with inputs
<5 GJ/ha/y), mainly developing ones, increased their cropped area
(net land extensification of 135 Mha). Overall, energy-use efficiency
(crop output/inputs) followed a U-shaped trajectory starting at about
3 and finishing close to 4. The prospects of a more sustainable in-
tensification are discussed, and the inadequacy of the land-sparing
model expectation of protecting wilderness via intensified agriculture
is highlighted.
EROI | Jevons paradox | land sharing | land sparing |
water–energy–food security nexus
The type of agricultural technology developed after the SecondWorld War, known as the “green revolution,” came under
early environmental criticism (1). Besides reliance on harmful
first-generation pesticides and soil deterioration caused by exces-
sive fertilization and compaction and erosion linked to the use of
heavy machinery, it was clear from the onset that the technologies
required to realize the genetic potential of new crop varieties and
hybrids also had a strong dependence on fossil fuels. Eating Oil (2)
was the revealing title of a book published after the energy crisis of
the 1970s (around the time of the US oil production peak). By
then, the work of pioneers such as Odum (3) and Pimentel et al.
(4) had already highlighted that this form of agriculture was un-
sustainable and was able to attain high yields only thanks to the
energy subsidies represented by equipment, fuel, chemicals, and
other supplies. They suggested a straightforward way of assessing
the energy-use efficiency (EUE) of production systems: their
output–input ratio, i.e., the relation between the solar energy fixed
by crops (as chemical energy in grains and other usable products)
and the input energy embedded in all human supplies, leaving
sunlight aside. This metric is equivalent to the first type of energy
return on investment (EROI) of Pelletier et al. (5): the energy
return in human-edible food or usable product on the industrially
mediated energy investment.
Early analyses showed that EUE decreased as intensification
(supplies used per unit area and time) increased, as expected by
the economic diminishing-return theory (6). Most of the later
work that we are aware of has focused on a particular country,
product, and/or production technology, such as conventional vs.
organic (e.g., refs. 7–12), and although some performed in-
ternational comparisons (13–15), apparently none has searched
for long-term, global trends. Otherwise, it is difficult to un-
derstand why, even when some analyses point to an increase in
EUE (e.g., refs. 11 and 15–18), there are authors that keep citing
early work such as Pimentel et al. (4) as the basis for claiming
unavoidable larger increases in supplies’ use than in production.
Reviews by Woods et al. (19) and Pelletier et al. (5) covered the
entire food system and highlighted a paucity of data for de-
veloping countries. Our goal was to address these gaps for crops.
An analysis of livestock production was out of our reach, because
it would have entailed tracking the (direct and indirect) use of
plant products for fodder within as well as between countries.
Taking advantage of FAOSTAT, the global database that the
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization started in
1961 (20), complemented by the best available energy conversion
factors [ECs; energy required (MJ/mass) for the production
process of inputs, and the energy content of crop products], we
seek to find discernible trends for on-farm crop EUE: Are there
consistent patterns in the use of machinery, fuel, and supplies
(translated into energetic subsidies) by continent and country?
Did those countries with higher intensification (inputs per unit
area per year) in fact release land from agricultural use, as
predicted by Norman Borlaug’s land-sparing hypothesis (21)?
Did those countries that increased agricultural area (i.e., that
extensified production) keep lower intensification levels along
the lines of the land-sharing, wildlife-friendly farming model
hypothesis (22)? How many edible (or, more generally, us-
able) calories are we getting out of every calorie spent in our
Significance
Global crop production tripled during the last 50 years, mainly by
an increase in yield (production/area). We show that the energy
embedded in the main oil-based inputs (machinery, fuel, and
fertilizers) increasedworldwide at a rate at first larger, but in the
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overall improved energy-use efficiency (EUE). This was explained
by advances in the nitrogen fertilizer industry, irrigation, and
other technologies and perhaps some environmental changes.
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realizing them depends on bold political decisions.
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croplands, and how much has this ratio changed over time? We
wonder whether technological change (improved genetic mate-
rials, better agronomic practices, and exploiting the synergy be-
tween the two; see ref. 23) and technology adoption were
sufficiently strong to counteract the negative effects on EUE of
(i) possible diminishing returns in crop energy efficiency and (ii)
decreasing average soil fertility by cultivating additional sub-
optimal areas and by deterioration of high-quality soils. We
made an effort to factor out energy efficiency improvements in
the manufacturing industry, which would have acted as a con-
founding force, in particular those in industrial nitrogen (N)
fertilizer production (19).
Results and Discussion
Intensification: Physical Data Analysis. The use of land, machinery,
and supplies increased globally during 1961–2014 but at very
different rates and with large differences between continents.
N fertilizer was the supply with the largest worldwide increase
(ca. 955%), and the smallest change was that of land use (10%)
(Table 1). As all inputs, including irrigation water, increased for
each continent at a faster pace than land did, intensification was
the norm. Besides, as global crop production more than tripled
during the period, these rates of fertilizer-use increase imply a
marked decline in crop nutrient-use efficiency, particularly for N;
in other words, there were diminishing returns on a mass basis.
A comparison between continents on an energy and per-area basis
is included in the next section. However, from the data in Table 1
it is clear that the relative leap in input-use during the period was
much smaller for North America and Europe than for the rest of
the world, which we interpret as those two continents having
already embraced green revolution technologies by 1961.
Fertilizer use trends differed among continents and between
nutrients. N fertilizers had the lowest relative increase in Europe
(threefold) and the highest in Oceania (35-fold). The average
amounts applied per hectare also showed remarkable differences:
Europe and North America had the highest N use at the beginning
of the study period (12.3 and 13.4 kg/ha, respectively) and were
outpaced by the mainly irrigated countries (MICs; see Supporting
Information) at the end of the period; Africa and Oceania, on the
other hand, had the lowest N use during all the period (0.9 and
1.3 kg/ha, respectively). Phosphorus (P) and potassium (K) fer-
tilizers showed a smaller relative increase than N ones (three- and
fivefold, respectively), but in Latin America and Asia the rate of
increase (although not use per hectare) was larger than for N. P
fertilizers are based on mined rock, with a foreseeable production
peak just a few decades ahead (24). For Europe, the trend of
fertilizer increase was far from linear: There was an initial big
increase to fight hunger after World War II, followed by a sig-
nificant drop as a reaction to the emerging environmental prob-
lems (25). Fifty years later, a similar process is perhaps occurring in
China (26), which in 2005 accounted for 57% (26.7 Mt) of the N
used by the MIC.
Machinery stock (in mass units) and the resultant diesel fuel
consumption doubled during the period and also showed large
differences among continents (Table 1). Africa and Oceania had
the smallest machinery stock during all the period, while North
America and Europe had the largest ones. Asia and the MIC
experienced the greatest increase in the machinery stock, 41-fold
and 24-fold, respectively. At the global scale, the land area used
for agriculture increased by 10% as the result of large increases
in Latin America (111%), Africa (58%), Oceania (55%), and
Asia (39%) and reductions in Europe (−18%) and North
America (−12%). Irrigated land increased at a higher rate than
overall land use in all regions, reflecting our classification of
countries: in 2014 it was almost 50% in the MICs and less than
10% in the rest of the world as a whole.
Intensification: Energy-Based Analysis. Using the ECs detailed in
Supporting Information, we could analyze in a common unit the
contribution of fertilizers, fuel, and machinery (both construc-
tion and maintenance) to crop production for each country and
continent. These inputs were generally under 5 GJ/ha/y for the
beginning of the study period (except for North America) and
above 5 GJ/ha/y toward the end (except for Africa) (Fig. 1).
Fertilizers as a proportion of total energy input increased from
23–30% to 41–48%, and thus machinery plus fuel decreased
from 70–77% to 52–59%, depending on the lifespan assumption
(Fig. S1). During the 1961–2014 period, the spread of in-
tensification was noticeable across Latin America, MICs, and
Asia, while it had already happened in North America and
Europe (reaching a maximum there around 1990) and has not
reached Africa (Fig. 1). Oceania behaved qualitatively as North
America but with much lower absolute input values because of a
poorer soil endowment. Crop production increased worldwide,
both on an absolute and per-area basis, but with different rates
and tempos among continents compared with their growth in
inputs. This led to contrasting trajectories in EUE but with
generally constant or decreasing trends for those continents
starting at high input levels and generally increasing trends for
those starting at low input levels (Fig. 1). Thus, overall, except
for Africa, EUE converged from initial values ranging between
1 and 20 toward the vicinity of 3 and 4, consistent with an almost
complete globalization of agricultural inputs and practices. Our
EUE estimate, translated to the common “cradle-to-gate” language,
Table 1. Agricultural land and inputs used by continent at the beginning (1961) and end (2014) of the period
studied
N fertilizer,
Mt
P fertilizer,
Mt
K fertilizer,
Mt Machinery, Mt Fuel, Mt
Cultivated
land, Mha
Irrigated
land, Mha
1961 2014 1961 2014 1961 2014 1961 2014 1961 2014 1961 2014 1961 2014
Continent
Africa 0.07 1.08 0.15 0.52 0.04 0.29 1.02 1.3 0.51 0.65 76 120 2 5
Asia 0.34 9.23 0.24 3.28 0.04 3.84 0.85 35.45 0.32 13.29 115 161 15 40
MIC 2.56 55.77 1.34 24.82 0.85 17.17 3.1 75.64 1.55 37.82 341 361 94 178
Europe 4.37 12.63 4.65 2.83 4.49 2.91 40.2 59.74 17.59 26.14 353 288 14 13
Latin America 0.28 7.32 0.27 6.42 0.14 6.26 2.85 14.71 1.25 6.43 83 175 5 18
North America 3.16 15.26 2.73 5.15 2.17 4.97 96.31 87.31 32.1 29.1 235 208 20 27
Oceania 0.04 1.4 0.59 0.91 0.05 0.23 4.93 5.24 1.64 1.75 30 47 1 3
Total 11 103 10 44 8 36 149 279 55 115 1,234 1,361 151 284
Rate of increase ×9 ×4 ×5 ×2 ×2 ×1.1 ×1.9
Continents exclude 12 MICs: Bangladesh, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Nepal, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, and South
Korea. Data for fertilizers, machinery for 1961, cultivated land (arable land, including irrigated land and permanent crops) are from
FAOSTAT (20). Data for machinery for 2014 are from refs. 20, 53, and 54; also see Supporting Information. The data for diesel fuel are
the authors’ estimates using ref. 54; also see Supporting Information.
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represents an energy use of ca. 4–5 GJ·t−1, on the order of what
was found by two recent reviews (5, 19) [assuming an energy
content of grains of 15 GJ/t (0.35 kcal/g), applicable to 85% of
the calories produced worldwide (8, 20).]
Although all continents slowed their growth in energy inputs per
hectare after the 1980s (in parallel with sinking prices for agri-
cultural commodities), there was an almost threefold increase in
total inputs from ca. 5 EJ for 1961 to ca. 13 EJ in 2014. This is
equivalent to 4.5 and 2.6% of the world’s primary energy supply
for the beginning and the end of our study period, respectively
(27). It is accepted that on-farm energy use represents by far the
smallest one in the food system, below that of transport, which in
turn can be several times smaller than the energy needed for
heating or cooling greenhouses, refrigeration, and processing (5).
Thus, despite the popularity of “food miles” (distance), a number
of other life-cycle components determine our food’s footprint,
ranging from seasonality to soil-nutrient extraction per unit of
harvested energy and protein (28). None of these can be ignored a
priori when making responsible dietary choices, since many are
likely to be at least as important as food miles.
For the globe, as for each continent, crop output in absolute
terms was always above pooled inputs, and thus EUE was >1.
Average global efficiency in the 1960s was between 2.5 and 3.5,
depending on the machinery lifespan assumption, but with a
clear decreasing trend toward the first half of the 1980s, followed
by an increase that in the last decade reached 3.5–4.5 (green
lines in Fig. 2). Such a bounce occurred because of a “break-
point” in the rate of increase of the global agricultural energy
subsidy that occurred sometime near 1980. Until then, the rate of
this increase was 330–298 PJ/y, and afterwards it was 53–43 PJ/y
(using 10-y and 30-y machinery lifespans, respectively), with the
actual change in 1980 being ± 0.85 (SE) and ± 0.86 for 10-y
and 30-y machinery lifespans, respectively (P value < 0.001)
(R software, Segmented package). As a consequence of this drop
in the precedent exorbitant growth of inputs and a constant in-
crease in production output (645 PJ/y), EUE started to increase
after 1980, probably now surpassing 4 (Mann–Kendall test;
P value = 2 × 10−16 for both 10-y and 30-y machinery lifespans).
The overall increasing trend in EUE during the last three de-
cades can be ascribed to several causes. There was an unmistak-
able effect of the improved energy efficiency of N-fertilizer
synthesis, which by the 1980s had nearly doubled (Table S1), as
shown by the difference between the actual EUE and those dis-
counting that effect (green vs. yellow lines in Fig. 2). The EUE
increase was not caused mainly by irrigation, since the change after
1985–1990 holds for every single continent and for the world even
after removing the 12 MICs (Fig. 3, black dashed line). (Note that
the increase in irrigated area for the non-MIC countries was of 49
Mha, less than 5% of the area of rainfed cultivated land) (Table 1).
The reasons for the sustained increase in EUE after discounting
the positive effects of irrigation and fertilizer industry improve-
ments can be several and are nonexclusive: genetically improved
varieties and hybrids, agronomic practices and tools, “fertilization”
by atmospheric carbon dioxide (which during the 1980s had al-
ready reached 350 ppm, or 23% above preindustrial levels), and
associated higher water use efficiency in rainfed C3 crops. Climate
change so far seems to have had mixed region- and crop-specific
effects on yields, positive in some cases but mostly insignificant to
negative in the 1980–2008 period (29). Finally, for Europe and
North America, part of the upward EUE trend might also be at-
tributed to a long-lasting legacy of prior fertilization (30).
Our analysis has several limitations that may have influenced
EUE figures. One is the lack of dependable data for pesticides
(Supporting Information). Moreover, a review of the most-used
methods to estimate pesticide ECs warns of the risks of un-
derestimation for chemicals introduced since 1985 (31). Our decision
of using a fixed EC for fuel may have caused a bias of comparable
magnitude but opposite sign (overestimation of fuel use). However,
rather than hoping for these errors to cancel each other, we claim
that having consistent worldwide databases for both is crucial to
refine these estimates. This is also necessary for irrigation data, be-
cause, even when we managed to separate those countries with
mostly rainfed agriculture, those broadly irrigated (i.e., MICs) ac-
count for ca. one-third of the plant-based energy output (20).
A
B
C
Fig. 1. (A) Annual energy input (GJ·ha−1·y−1) as the sum of fertilizers (N, P,
and K), machinery (construction and maintenance), and fuel. (B) Total an-
nual energy production from all crops (output; GJ·ha−1·y−1). (C) Annual EUE
for each continent estimated as the ratio of crop production (GJ) to energy
input (GJ) (note log scale). Solid and dashed lines in A and C are for 10- and
30-y machinery lifespans, respectively (Supporting Information). Data are
shown for six geographical continents, excluding countries with 30% or
more agricultural land under irrigation in 2005 (these are presented sepa-
rately as MICs and are listed in Materials and Methods). Data for input,
production, and land are from FAOSTAT (20); input ECs are from Table S1;
crop ECs are from the FAO (Supporting Information).
Fig. 2. Total annual energy input (in EJ), crop production (in EJ), and EUE
of the 58 main crop-producing countries. “Outdated” and “Updated”
N-fertilizer technology refer to industrial energy efficiency in synthesizing
ammonia (Supporting Information). Energy input and EUE are presented for
two machinery lifespan scenarios: 10 y (solid line) and 30 y (broken line).
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Intensification vs. Extensification. Our results include examples
consistent with both the land-sparing and the land-sharing
models, not only in terms of the number of countries but also
of the net area released from or incorporated into agriculture. Of
the 30 countries that kept a low intensification level or in-
tensified later (time-averaged inputs <5 GJ/ha/y), 24 increased
their cropped area (pink panels in Fig. 4); conversely, of the
28 countries with higher intensification (inputs >5 GJ/ha/y),
23 barely changed or decreased it (blue panels in Fig. 4). Even
when there are exceptions (unshaded panels in Fig. 4), including
very large countries such as China and the former Union of So-
cialist Soviet Republics (USSR), the pattern also holds when
analyzed by area: Low-intensification countries in the upper
left unshaded panels abandoned a total of 42.0 Mha, and those
in the pink-shaded ones incorporated 177.5 Mha, leading to a
net extensification of 135.5 Mha. Symmetrically, high-intensification
countries in the blue panels had a combined land release of
56.6 Mha, whereas those in the unshaded ones extended their
crops by 25.2 Mha, leading to a net release of 31.4 Mha. This
incorporation of some areas into agriculture when others are si-
multaneously spared elsewhere resembles the global trend sum-
marized by Bruinsma (32) for the 1961–2005 period, namely that
for every 5 ha newly incorporated into agriculture (mainly in de-
veloping countries) 1 ha was released (mainly in developed ones).
These estimates at the national level, however, should be con-
sidered an underestimation of such turnover, because it is very
likely that something of the same sort is happening within each
country for physical (e.g., erosion or salinization) or political (e.g.,
planning policies) reasons.
In our data, all continents (including MICs) are represented in
the four combinations of intensification–extensification, and the
pattern, as in Bruinsma (32), seems to be explained more by de-
velopment stage than by geography (or irrigation). Besides, it is
important to underline that a consistency with either the land-
sparing or land-sharing prediction does not constitute proof of
their validity as explanations. The associations highlighted by color
in Fig. 4 can have different causes in different countries, even
reversing the causality proposed by those hypotheses. For example,
some land-poor countries may turn to intensification as their only
option, and some land-rich ones may opt for extensification only,
without increasing inputs. Also, the land-sparing hypothesis rests
on at least two questionable assumptions: (i) that demand for ag-
ricultural products is inelastic, which is becoming more and more
unrealistic in a globalized world where grains are increasingly used
for fodder or biofuels (21), and (ii) that land spared from high-
intensity cropping will turn to better-conserved land, which is un-
likely (33), among other reasons because the options for land use
are almost endless (34). Thus, successful intensification should not
be regarded as a guarantee of land sparing.
Despite the apparently small increase in agricultural area on a
percentage basis, expansion during the period included at least
110 million ha. This is expected to keep growing at similar rates,
particularly concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America,
and some countries such as Russia and Indonesia (34, 35).
Rockström et al. (36) listed land-system change as one of the main
threats to planetary health and warned about our proximity to the
safety boundary of ca. 15% of intensively used continental area.
Land agricultural use interacts strongly with sustainability dimen-
sions at a range of spatial scales, including the global one, since the
rates of fertilization typical of intensive agriculture have potential
for large releases of N-based greenhouse gases per hectare.
However, if properly managed, associated land sparing could avoid
the release of more than sufficient CO2 to offset them (37).
Closing Remarks. Starting during the 1960s and 1970s with ex-
cessive levels of input use in North America and Europe and very
low ones almost everywhere else, most of the world converged
toward the present, more standardized set of agricultural inputs.
This green revolution wave spread from both sides of the North
Atlantic toward Asia and Latin America without fully reaching
Africa. Differences among countries remain, not only because of
dissimilar histories and natural constraints, which are particularly
challenging in Africa (38), but also because of political decisions
such as banning genetically modified organisms or fostering ir-
rigation. Still, we observed a consistent global increase in farm-
level EUE for the last 30 y that, even after discounting the
substantial industrial improvements in N-fertilizer synthesis, has
allowed today’s farms to be as energy efficient as those at the
beginning of the green revolution. Pelletier et al. (5) have argued
that diminishing energy returns are not warranted in food sys-
tems. This is perhaps reasonable, given that Liebig’s law of the
minimum would strictly apply only to single inputs, and seems to
be confirmed by our Fig. 3. However, even if our estimates for
the last decades are somewhat optimistically biased, it is clear
that the predictions of an unavoidable drop in EUE were not
fulfilled and that the combined effect of all the factors discussed
above was to counteract the expected negative trend in soil
quality by intensification and extensification.
A further limitation worth mentioning is our assumption of
human labor as quantitatively unimportant in energy terms.
Because FAOSTAT focused on commodities, i.e., tradable ag-
ricultural products, it very likely underestimates what is pro-
duced in small farms (which is expected to be used mainly for
self-consumption within the same household), where human la-
bor can be an important subsidy. As an extreme, where it is the
only subsidy, EUE needs to amount to 10–20 to make up for the
inefficiency of our homoeothermic metabolism (6, 39). Small
farms cannot be ignored, and for some crops they represent a
sizable share of worldwide production (40). Rice, in particular,
which contributes one-fifth of the calories for the average human
diet, is mostly grown in farms smaller than 5 ha, with the smallest
(<2 ha) contributing more than half of worldwide production.
Thus, for rice, and possibly also for other food staples of regional
or local importance, our analysis would underestimate the en-
ergy contribution of human labor and perhaps also that of draft
animals (39).
Despite its limitations and biases, we think that our analysis is
robust with respect to an increase in EUE for rainfed agriculture
in commercial-scale farms. We deem it worthwhile to highlight
also what has not happened in parallel with this improvement in
EUE: Resources have not been saved and have not even been
Fig. 3. Crop production as a function of energy input for the 58 main crop-
producing countries (average of 10- and 30-y machinery lifespan assump-
tion). The black dashed line represents the world excluding MICs and excluding
improvements in N-fertilizer manufacturing (using outdated technology). The
arrows start at the averages for 1961–1965, 1975–1980, 1985–1990, 1995–2000,
and 2003–2008, and the last ends in 2010–2014. Three fixed EUE lines (3:1, 2:1,
and 1:1) are presented as reference.
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used at a constant rate. On the contrary, their consumption in-
creased by a factor of 2.6 (Fig. 2). As counterintuitive as it seems,
such a rebound effect, known as the “Jevons paradox,” is a well-
established principle of environmental economics (41). During the
industrial revolution, William S. Jevons observed that engineering
improvements leading to more efficient steam engines increased
the demand for coal to power them. We have shown that, during
the green revolution, agronomic improvements led to a threefold
improvement in average yield (GJ·ha−1·y−1 or t·ha−1·y−1), i.e.,
land-use efficiency. However, instead of preventing land clearing,
and much less causing the land-sparing hoped for by Norman
Borlaug, the higher productivity brought about a regionally sig-
nificant extensification (concentrated in Asia and Latin America)
fueled by a more elastic global demand than he envisioned (21).
(Although we acknowledge that land clearing would have been
much larger had the increase in yields not happened; see ref. 42.)
Coming from a 50-y worldwide experiment, the significance of this
pattern cannot be overstated: Technological improvements make
land savings possible but do not guarantee them, and in a mostly
open trade market are very likely to backfire. Thus, we agree with
Rudel et al. (21) that extensification can be brought to a halt only
by proactive policy intervention.
Agricultural and other intensive land uses have been iden-
tified as the major global driver behind the loss of terrestrial
biodiversity and ecosystem functioning (43, 44). However, ex-
tinctions can be deceptively unresponsive to land clearance for at
least two reasons. One is the inherent delay in population dy-
namics, even after a species has diminished beyond its viable
local density threshold (extinction debt) (45). Another is the
positive but nonlinear relationship between terrestrial bio-
diversity and unfarmed area (46, 47). Thus, the detrimental
effects of land use can be easily underestimated, or even
overlooked, and need to be better communicated at all levels.
The research community has to keep advancing knowledge, but
this is not enough. We must become aware of the very limited
impact that our work can have if we assume that decision makers
will act according to our preferences or advice (48). On the
contrary, there is a range of roles that need to be fulfilled to
reach relevant audiences with better-targeted approaches and
messages (49).
In sum, we have shown that on-farm technological changes
have led to yield improvements at surprisingly constant, and
perhaps even growing, EUE. This leaves room for optimism re-
garding the prospects of a sustainable intensification, particularly
Fig. 4. Most important agricultural countries (responsible for 95% of global crop production) classified by average energy input (GJ/ha/y) and net percentage
of land cleared or incorporated for agriculture. Energy input (GJ/ha/y) is the sum of fertilizers (N, P, K), machinery (construction and maintenance), and fuel
from 1961–2014 (Supporting Information). The percentage of net land cleared or released for agriculture between 1961–1965 and 2010–2014 is the FAO’s
Agricultural Land and Permanent Crops average. Pink panels conform to the land-sharing hypothesis, and blue panels conform to the land-sparing one. Italics
indicate generalized irrigation (MICs).
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considering that many available proven technologies (including
nonappropriable ones) have not been adopted yet (50, 51).
(However, see ref. 52 for a concerned view on the slow rates of
genetic improvement, development of farm-ready cultivars, and
farmer’s adoption.) It is also encouraging to see that in-
tensification alone could be able to meet the projected food
demand (e.g., ref. 37), but this would not necessarily mean al-
leviating hunger if waste is not reduced and, above all, if income
equity remains at its current unacceptable levels (or if other
means are not found to improve food distribution, ominously
called “access”). Intensification will not avoid environmental
impacts if we are not watchful and proactive regarding chemical,
edaphic, and biological risks and if policy interventions to avoid
simultaneous extensification are lacking. No matter how sus-
tainable future gains in productivity per unit of land may be, in
the current business-as-usual atmosphere they will not prevent
further clearance and associated detrimental changes.
Materials and Methods
The countries listed in Fig. 4, responsible for 95% of the production of the
10 main crops (on an energy basis) in 2005, were selected for our analysis
using the FAOSTAT database (ref. 20; last accessed, May 2017). From the
same database we obtained crop production, land use, machinery, and
fertilizers consumption data for each of those countries during 1961–2014.
The physical quantities for outputs and inputs (mass per year) were con-
verted to energy units using ECs from the literature. A great variability
among the ECs used in agricultural energy analyses was found, so we
detail our choices and their rationale in Supporting Information. There we
use sensitivity analysis to show that the most important source of un-
certainty was the choice of machinery lifespan. Since we were not able to
estimate ECs for irrigation, countries in which most of their 2005 pro-
duction included watering (irrigated area >30%) were treated separately
as MICs: Bangladesh, Chile, China, Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Nepal, The
Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, and South Korea.
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Country Selection
The countries responsible for 95% of the year 2005 production
(energy output, e.g., grain, edible roots, and so forth) of the
10 principal crops were selected for our 1961–2014 analysis using
the FAOSTAT database (ref. 1; last accessed, May 2017). Crops
used for the country selection were barley, cassava, corn, palm
fruit, potatoes, rice, soybean, sugar beet, sugar cane, and wheat, but
then all crops were taken into account to estimate country output.
An analysis by crop was beyond our reach because FAOSTAT
input data are pooled at the country level. The country tally was
58–62, depending on the period. We used USSR values until 1991,
and thereafter used the sum of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Belarus, and Uzbekistan (94% of the former USSR area).
An important input for which we had very limited data was
irrigation water: FAO’s AQUASTAT is still developing as a
worldwide long-term database for irrigated area (see ref. 2);
besides, we were unable to discriminate types of irrigation
(gravitational, sprinkling, or dripping) and thus were unable to
resolve volume or water source (surface, deep, desalinized), and
much less ECs. Therefore countries with more than 30% of their
agricultural area under irrigation in 2005 were analyzed sepa-
rately as MICs to avoid overestimation of EUE due to the
positive effect of irrigation on crop production. Assuming that
yields under irrigation at least double those with no irrigation,
MICs would be countries with most of their production coming
from irrigated fields. Those 12 countries are listed at the end of
Materials and Methods and were treated as a separate “continent.”
Mexico was included in Latin America, instead of in North
America. A permutation test [multiple response permutation pro-
cedure; MRPP; (3)] confirmed statistically significant differences in
average input per hectare between the seven continents so defined
as a priori groups (P value < 0.001). The list of MICs, that of main-
output countries, and the identity of the 10 main crops were not
influenced by the decision to use the 2005 snapshot.
Crop Production and Land Use
Data for agricultural land (arable land and permanent crops) and
irrigated land were obtained from FAOSTAT and used to cal-
culate inputs per hectare. To estimate the degree of exten-
sification, we averaged the 2010–2014 (t2) and the 1961–1965
(t1) values of arable land and permanent crops and then esti-
mated the percentage of net land cleared for agriculture as [(t2 −
t1)/t1]100. The physical amount of cereals, cocoa, coffee, fruits,
mate, oil palm, pulses, rapeseed, roots and tubers, soybeans,
sugar beet, sugar cane, sunflower, tea, and vegetables produced
were also obtained from FAOSTAT. Crop production values
(t) were multiplied by their specific energy content (MJ/t; ref.
4) and were summed to transform all crops to a single energy
value of each country’s annual production (output).
Inputs
The tools and supplies included in the analyses were machinery,
fuel, and fertilizers. The number of machines used in each coun-
try was obtained from the sum of tractors and harvesters and
threshers from the Machinery Archive in FATOSTAT. Ma-
chinery (mass units) and fuel consumption per machine for each
country were estimated using the Stout (5) standards explained
below. All the countries had missing machinery data after 2003,
and we used Pawlak’s (6) estimations for 2005 and 2010, as-
suming for each country (i) a linear increase or decrease be-
tween 2003–2005 and 2005–2009 and (ii) a constant value for
2010–2014.
N, P, and K fertilizer use was obtained from FAOSTAT. The
FAO’s metadata on fertilizers warn against the uncritical use of
the two databases covering our study period (1961–2002 and
2002–2014), due to changes in methodology. We found that the
differences between the two datasets in FAOSTAT for the
global use of N, P, and K fertilizers in 2002 were only 2%, 3%
and 15%, respectively. Since our objective was to analyze trends,
rather than precise absolute values, we used both databases
(starting with the new one from 2003 onwards).
ECs
The physical quantities for outputs and inputs (mass per year)
were converted to energy units using ECs from the literature
(Table S1). We did not include transportation of either supplies
or harvested products. Our EC choices and their rationale are
given below.
Machinery and Fuel.We used the coefficients proposed by Stout (5)
for machinery size and fuel consumption for each region: Ma-
chinery mass of 15 t/unit for the United States, Canada, and
Australia, 8 t/unit for Latin America and Europe, and 6 t/unit for
Asia and Africa. For fuel consumption we used coefficients of
5 t·unit−1·y−1 for the United States, Canada, and Australia,
3.5 t·unit−1·y−1 for Latin America and Europe, and 3 t·unit−1·y−1
for Asia and Africa. Although these are all obvious simplifica-
tions, none of them assumes any temporal trend and thus (unlike
N-fertilizer industry efficiency) they do not alter the EUE pat-
tern shown in Fig. 2.
We were not able to find studies of energy use in the farm
machinery manufacturing industry. In fact, the only ECs used in
previous agricultural analyses, and apparently the only publicly
available ones, are based on car industry studies (7). We used the
energy needed for manufacture (80.9 GJ/t) (7) and then added
55% of it as the energy needed for repairs (44.5 GJ/t) (8). Finally,
the sum of manufacture and repairing energy was divided by the
estimated lifespan (10 and 30 y, see Sensitivity Analyses below) to
transform the energy input into an annual value (Table S1).
Little variability was found for fuel EC, and an average from the
literature was used (Table S1).
Fertilizers.Thanks to improvements in the Haber–Bosch technology,
the energy required for ammonia industrial synthesis has no-
ticeably decreased during the analyzed period (Table S1) (9).
Also, N-fertilizer ECs are country specific as a consequence of
different energy sources (gas, coal, or heavy oil). We reviewed
the ECs from the literature and selected gas-based ones for
all countries, except for China and India, in which the coal-
based (China) and heavy oil-based (India) sources demand
1.7 and 1.3 times as much energy, respectively, as a natural
gas-based process (10). As there were missing years in the lit-
erature for these two countries’ ammonia synthesis energy ef-
ficiency, we multiplied the gas-based values by 1.7 in China and
by 1.3 in India.
For P and K fertilizers, constant values were used for the whole
period. Little information about these ECs is available, but, as a
consequence of the lesser amounts used (compared with N), the
impact on the total energy input is low (11). We used the average
of the ECs most cited in the scientific literature (Table S1).
Sensitivity Analyses
Zegada-Lizarazu et al. (11) highlighted the great variability
found among the ECs used in agricultural energy analyses. To
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understand howmuch EC choices affected estimated energy inputs,
we performed a sensitivity analysis of three factors: (i) the delay
in incorporating the latest industrial ammonia technology for
N-fertilizer synthesis, (ii) the lifespan of farm machinery, and
(iii) fuel consumption. For (i) an immediate incorporation vs. a 10-y
delay was evaluated, for (ii) 10-, 20-, and 30-y lifespans, and for
(iii) ±10%, 20%, and 30%. The difference in (i) for the world
average energy input was 0.73 EJ (7% summed over the 1961–
2014 period), being larger for the 10-y delay in N-technology
incorporation. For (ii) the difference between the 10-y and
20-y machinery lifespan was 0.5 EJ (5%), the difference between
the 20-y and 30-y machinery lifespan was 1.4 EJ (14%), and the
difference between the 10-y and 30-y machinery lifespan was 1.9
EJ (19%). Fuel consumption uncertainty (iii) had a relatively
minor impact on overall energy use: ±4%, 8%, and 12% for
over- and underestimations of 10%, 20%, and 30%, respectively,
with a negligible effect of the lifespan assumption. Results for
lifespan and fuel consumption were barely affected by the delay
(0–10 y) used for N-technology. We decided to work with the
immediate technological incorporation (updated N-fertilizer
technology) and 10 y and 30 y machinery lifespans. This allowed us
to bracket input and EUE estimations in the face of the largest
uncertainty found in ECs. Additionally, for Fig. 2, we performed
a graphical analysis of the effect of no progress in (i.e., the use of
outdated) N-fertilizer technology.
The uncertainty for the contribution of pesticides to the energy
input is large, with a range of estimates between 6% and 16%
(12). Although ECs are available (e.g., refs. 12 and 13), there is no
worldwide long-term database of consumption at the country
level. Although the FAO’s pesticide database has data starting
from 1990, their developers warn against the use of these data
for intercountry comparisons because of inconsistencies in re-
ports. Thus, we estimated their overall contribution to the global
energy input: Fungicides, bactericides, herbicides, and insecti-
cides (grouped in “Pesticides”) consumption for our 58 selected
countries was summed for each year, and the annual energy in-
put was calculated using ECs from ref. 12. This resulted in 364 PJ
for 1990 and 565 PJ for 2014, i.e., an increase of 55%. However,
the relative contribution to the agricultural inputs was between
2% and 6%, with no clear-cut temporal trend. As this input is
generally considered minor in terms of energy, with the possible
exception of horticulture (14), and our own estimates place it
between 2% and 6% of the total energy input, we excluded it
from the analysis.
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Table S1. ECs for fertilizers, machinery, and fuel for 1961–2014
Input Region Period Unit Value Ref(s).
N fertilizer China 1961–1965 GJ/t N 165.24 1, 2
1966–1979 GJ/t N 123.93 1, 2
1980–1984 GJ/t N 88.6 3
1985–1989 GJ/t N 69.1 3
1990–1994 GJ/t N 66.3 3
1995–1999 GJ/t N 61.3 3
2000–2014 GJ/t N 40.2 3
India 1961–1965 GJ/t N 126.36 1, 2
1966–1978 GJ/t N 94.77 1, 2
1979–1982 GJ/t N 75.3 4
1983–1985 GJ/t N 71.6 4
1986–1987 GJ/t N 68 4
1988–1990 GJ/t N 60.7 4
1991 GJ/t N 59.5 4
1992–1993 GJ/t N 58.3 4
1994 GJ/t N 55.9 4
1995–2014 GJ/t N 55.9 4
Rest of
the world
1955–1965 GJ/t N 97.2 1
1966–1980 GJ/t N 72.9 1
1981–1990 GJ/t N 60.7 1
1991–2000 GJ/t N 51.6 1
2001–2014 GJ/t N 45.5 2
P fertilizer World 1961–2014 GJ/t P2O5 14.2 5–7
K fertilizer World 1961–2014 GJ/t K2O 10 5–7
Machinery (10 y) World 1961–2014 GJ/t/y 12.5 8, 9
Machinery (30 y) World 1961–2014 GJ/t/y 4.2 8, 9
Fuel World 1961–2014 GJ/t 45.5 10–12
Values within parentheses in Machinery indicate machinery lifespan in
years.
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